Union is now divided into 15 independent countries, each with its own government and national strategic interests and objectives. For much of the past 15 years, Russia has maintained a relatively low profile in international affairs with only hints at her long range national security strategy. With suspension of her participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and her more recent intervention in Georgia, however, Russia has taken significant steps toward restoration of her role as a major great power in Eurasia. The question is what these events signal regarding Russia national security strategy? What are the goals of that strategy? What ways has she chosen to achieve her ends, and how will she resource them? This project attempts to answer these questions. Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and her more recent intervention in Georgia, Russia has taken significant steps toward restoration of her role as a major conventional power in Eurasia. Using Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty as a breakpoint, this paper will examine recent Russian actions in an effort to understand the national security strategy of the Putin/Medvedev era. What are the goals of this strategy? What ways has she chosen to achieve her ends, and how will she resource them?
RUSSIA: GREAT POWER ASPIRATIONS AND ITS RESULTING
The Russian announcement in December 2007 that she had suspended participation in the CFE Treaty should not have come as a surprise. This was a long time coming. Arms control limitation treaties were a useful tool during the Cold War.
They helped to maintain the balance of power and to limit further defense spending.
These treaties had their limitations and did not satisfy all participants. The CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990 and entered into force 17 July 1992. 2 It was originally signed by 16 NATO and 6 Warsaw Pact States. It established equal levels for five categories of offensive weapons, to include battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. 3 The treaty included both destruction and inspection protocols and was "aimed to reach a balance of conventional forces in
Europe between the two groups of state parties following a forty month long reduction phase." 4 The treaty imposed limits on those weapons the signatories could possess between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. "To guard against offensives designed to bypass central Europe, specific 'flank zone' limits restricted weapons stationed in northern and southern Europe." 5 The treaty was written in such a way that as new countries joined NATO, their limits were set by bloc and not individual country.
By 1991, a year after the treaty signature, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had disintegrated. Russia, as the "inheritor state" to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), was burdened by the controls placed on the Warsaw Pact, whereas NATO's relative burden did not change, as the new members brought with them their share of their former Warsaw Pact allowances. Of further importance, the United States (U.S.) was hardly affected at all, as her forces in Europe were drawing down, and she still retained an overwhelming force projection capability. Thus the CFE PATRIOT missiles could take out many of the Russian ICBMS in the boost phase.
Secondly, with less of a deterrent force, Russia would have fewer options and could be pushed to take an offensive action, e.g., conduct a first strike, further escalating the crisis. 16 The Russians are especially unhappy with a perceived U.S. proclivity for taking unilateral action in the Russian "sphere of influence", the former Warsaw Pact and the former territory of the U.S.S.R., without consulting Russia. As the Russians see the issue, the U.S. completed agreements with both Poland and the Czech Republic while she was still negotiating with the Russians to assuage the latter's concerns. This is an example of Russian concerns being minimized by the U.S. which is anathema to a core goal of Russia's national security strategy -to regain prominence in Central Asia and specifically with the Russian Near Abroad.
Russia also sees the threat differently and does not believe that either Iran or
North Korea currently has the missile capability which would necessitate the U.S.-European missile defense shield. 17 The U.S. maintains that the Iranian threat is real.
Iran is currently developing variants of the Shahab-3, with reported ranges from 1000 to 2,500 kilometers, which purportedly have the capability to attack targets in Europe and the Middle East. 18 The North Korean ballistic missile threat is from the Taepo Dong family of missiles, with ranges of 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers for the Taepo Dong 1, and 4,000 to 8,000 kilometers for the Taepo Dong 2. North Korea is also thought to be developing land and sea based medium and intermediate range ballistic missile systems, which would be capable of reaching targets in Europe and the U.S. 19 Russia is not immune to concerns regarding homeland security. While she may not agree on the need for the missile defense shield, she will most likely use diplomatic power through two organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the UN, at her disposal to monitor the actions of both Iran and North Korea, respectively, in regards to this missile threat, thereby addressing another national security strategy goal, that of homeland security.
In 2008 Republic is to be informed promptly of any engagements." 20 The U.S. is limited to no more than 250 site personnel and must get permission before she may host site visits by non-U.S. personnel. 21 The Russian activity in both Ukraine, where half the country is pro-West, the other pro-Russia, and Estonia highlight the actions Russia will take to secure its national interests. Even though their economies are tied so closely to that of Russia that it would be difficult to sever any relationship completely, Ukraine and Estonia have tried to flex their independent muscle much to the chagrin of Russia and have suffered the In Ukraine, Russia has issued passports to individuals of Russian descent and has fomented discontent amongst her Russian supporters to destabilize the government. Any discussions regarding NATO membership has created, and, will continue to create an internal crisis in Ukraine, between the two camps, the pro-West and pro-Russian, and could result in regime failure. While Russia tolerated membership of the Baltic countries in NATO, it draws the line on the Ukraine. For Russia, Ukraine is a critical cog in its national security strategy. She relies on Ukraine for a warm weather port (Sevastopol which Russia is leasing until 2017) for its Black Sea Fleet and for the major transit points/pipelines for Russian oil and gas exports to the West. 27 Ukraine's transition to a democratic state and eagerness to make her own alliances and political agreements and decrease dependence on a former ally is a danger to Russia for it sets a precedent for other border countries to follow and adversely impacts the Russian national security goal of regaining primacy over her neighbors. that NATO sees Russia as a force to be reckoned with economically and militarily, which is a successful start for a country wanting to get back into the great power game. Withdrawal from the CFE Treaty was intended to achieve similar results for Russia's national security. With no inspections and information exchanges with which to be concerned, the Russian military had no one monitoring its movements and was able to mobilize and go into Georgia quickly and without prior notice when the situation presented itself. This may have been harder to do if Russia was still an active participant in the CFE Treaty and limited in placing armored forces on its southern flank.
In this way, using two elements of national power, diplomatic (withdrawal from the CFE Treaty) and military (troops into Georgia), Russia was able to address a national objective of restoring her role as the major conventional power in the region. She also faced little risk as Putin correctly estimated that the world's focus was on the Iraq and Afghanistan crises. Russia did not limit herself to the military element of power. She also used political power in efforts to achieve her goals in the Near Abroad. An example of this is Russia's issuance of Russian passports to Russians and sympathetic non-Russian minorities in the Near Abroad. Russian dissemination of passports to the Russian nationals in these countries, however, has only succeeded in fueling the fire and instigating dissension amongst the populace. 37 Putin also used political power to coerce her close allies, e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan, to support the Russian action, though they provided lukewarm support at best. In theory, from an economic standpoint, Russia has what it needs to be considered a great power. She has territory, the majority of the nuclear and military arms from the former Soviet Union, and economic potential. Economically, Russia has enormous gas and oil reserves and has used these to improve her economic position.
Russia also addressed its policy toward her
Russia is believed to have about 30 percent of the world's natural gas reserves and is second only to Saudi Arabia when it comes to producing oil. 41 The World Bank recently analyzed the impact of the global economic downturn on Russia and estimated that
Russia will lose about $50 billion in net capital this year, but also commended Russia for her swift response, the $200 billion rescue package, to shore up her financial system. 42 It is too early to tell how successful Russia will be in protecting herself from the current global economic travails.
Russia's abundant natural resources should allow her to achieve her national objective of being a world economic power, if the government uses those as a base on which to build a modern economy. This economic status has already paid unexpected dividends, for it has allowed Russia to take actions which would normally be considered unacceptable to the international community. Withdrawal from the CFE Treaty and the Russian incursion into Georgia are two such actions. While there is disagreement as to whether the CFE Treaty has a formal withdrawal option (the Russians believe it does while NATO does not), NATO will most likely choose not to charge that Russia is in violation as there is too much at stake, both economically and politically. 43 NATO has turned a blind eye for fear of escalating the political atmosphere. NATO members rely a great deal on Russian crude oil and natural gas and are hesitant to take any action to jeopardize this support. In 2007, Russia provided 38% of gas and 33% of oil to the European Union (E.U.) 44 For the same reason, NATO has taken little action against Russia over the Georgian situation. While it did suspend activity of the NATO/Russia
Council for three months, NATO announced in December 2008 that it was going to resume the Council activities on an informal basis. 45 Punishment for the Russian incursion into Georgia was worth three months of sitting in the corner. While NATO nations continue to look for alternate sources of crude oil and gas, there are no quick fixes. Russia remains the E.U.'s main supplier of oil and gas.
Russia, however, is just as dependent on her consumers as they are on Russia.
This symbiotic relationship also makes Russia vulnerable to fluctuations in the world oil/gas prices and vulnerable to the demands of transit countries. She has taken action to increase customer dependency by creating a virtual oil and gas monopoly and Ukraine is the only current method to get natural gas supplies to both Central and Western Europe. 46 The 2009 incident took nineteen days to resolve and caused an international panic, as Europe was in the midst of one of its worst winters.
To deliver gas to Europe, Russian pipelines run through the territory of Ukraine.
Russia provides the gas, Ukraine, as the transit country, pays Russia for the gas and taxes the gas transiting through its territory. As Russia and Ukraine operate on annual contracts, these contracts are heavily dependent upon current gas prices and the status of the Russian/Ukrainian relationship. Russia used the recent downturn in prices and Ukraine's desire to join NATO, to increase the price it charges Ukraine to a level comparable to other European customers. Russia used economic power to punish Ukraine for cozying up to NATO by arguing that since Ukraine wanted out of the Russian sphere, then she should no longer receive a Russian discount but pay what the other European customers pay for gas. 47 Russia has a long history of threatening to cut off gas supplies when negotiations do not go well or if she dislikes an action taken by one of her neighbors. This "oil-gas blackmail" is risky and not a constructive strategy for a supplier who wants to keep its customers. Russia still has the upper hand in most negotiations, however, because she is the only game, or pipeline, in town.
Russia also continues to look for ways to secure its oil and gas delivery capability to the EU and other customers without disruptions by intermediaries. By bypassing the Near Abroad, Russia will be able to use the "energy weapon" to influence those countries in the Near Abroad without disrupting supplies to the other European countries. Russia's Baltic Pipeline System expansion will also enable her to provide oil direct to European markets without having to transit through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia is also revisiting the proposed pipeline that would deliver oil from Siberia to China. 48 Russia is also actively pursuing other ways to increase her oil and gas reserves.
Within the past year, the Russian navy has resumed its activity in the Arctic Sea near the Svalbard archipelago. This area is thought to be rich in oil, gas, and precious metal formally established footprints in the area. 49 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the treaty which governs activity in the Arctic, states that "any littoral state can lay claim to territory within 200 nautical miles of its shoreline and can develop any resources within that zone…the distance can expand to up to some 350 miles if the littoral state can provide scientific proof that the undersea continental plate is a natural extension of its territory. 50 In May 2008, the United States, Norway, Canada, Russia, and Denmark agreed to start talks on how to proceed in the Arctic and how to share its natural resources.
The U.S. National Geologic Survey estimates that up to "20% of the world's hydrocarbon reserves could be under the Arctic Ocean." 51 While it may take years for exploitation, which is dependent on the effect of global warming melting the ice cap and whether the expense to exploit the resources outweighs the costs, this could become a future international hotspot with many countries competing for exploitation rights.
Russia intends to play a significant role in this region. In September 2008, Russian President Medvedev stated that "Our priority task is to turn the Arctic into Russia's resource base of the 21st century. In order to fulfill this task, we should first resolve a number of special issues. The main issue is to ensure and firmly defend Russia's national interests in that region." 52 Exploitation of the resources in the Arctic would positively impact future Russian economic prospects and her ability to be recognized as a world economic power (two key parts of Russia's national security strategy).
The UN is now in the middle of this debate and has given countries until May 2009 to provide the proof required. A potential contentious area is the Lomonosov Ridge, which is a 1,800 kilometer section of the continental shelf claimed by Russia, Canada, and Denmark. 53 Exploitation of the Arctic will be a hot topic in future NATO discussions. It would be very surprising if any country agreed to grant this untapped resource-rich environment to the exclusive use of any one country. There is too much at stake and too many competing national interests involved.
Putin understands that to be a great power, one must have a strong economy and a professional military. He now needs to identify appropriate courses of action to achieve these goals. Program is estimated at $434.1 million for FY08. 59 This funding has been critical to securing nuclear weapons stockpiles within the former Soviet Union. Russia also receives funding (Administration request for $50 million in FY08) under the Freedom Support Act (FSA) for democratization, market reform, and social and humanitarian aid. 60 The total funding stream available to Russia from U.S. taxpayers over the past two years has exceeded half a billion dollars. While these funds cannot go directly into Russian military expenditures, they offset Russian state expenditures, and the offset can be added to the defense budget.
Russia has taken several courses of action in pursuit of her national security strategy goals vis-à-vis her neighbors, to regain a preponderant position and neutralize any, she will take to counter this Russian intrusion into the Western Hemisphere.
Now that the inauguration of President Obama has occurred, both the U.S. and Russia appear to be taking small steps to repair the damage in the relationship.
President Obama appears open to revisiting arms control treaties and European missile defense shield, while the Russians may be willing to relook missile defense plans for
Kaliningrad. 68 The Russian strategy vis-à-vis the U.S. is very fluid, however, and appears to change daily Russian leaders may be unable to resource all they want to accomplish in the new national security strategy. It remains to be seen how much risk they will be willing to take and how they will manage the expectations of the Russian people if they choose to pursue an aggressive vice conservative approach to accomplishing this strategy.
Based on Russia's policies under Putin and Medvedev, the outlines of the new national security strategy can be discerned. This strategy focuses on regional security (creating a buffer between Russia and the West) and blunting NATO expansion on her borders; homeland security and protection from terrorists and the proliferation of WMD;
taking care of Russian citizens outside of Russia's boundaries (the Near Abroad); economic power (having the resources to grow, influence, and lead economic powers);
international prominence (to be relevant and consulted in the manner of an equal partner or global power, a great power); regaining the primacy she once held over her neighbors; and, neutralizing the U.S. ability to operate freely in the Eurasian region (without Russian support). Russia will need to use all available resources, to include political, diplomatic, military, and economic, to ensure success of her national security strategy.
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